Saul Kripke’s Naming and Necessity is undoubtedly one of the most important books within the analytic philosophy tradition in the second half of the 20th century, if not the most important one. Kripke develops a new understanding of the significant metaphysical concepts of necessity and contingency and sharply distinguishes those from the epistemic concepts a priori and a posteriori. In this seminar, we will read the most decisive passages from Kripke’s work and discuss his most influential positions, theses, and arguments. Specifically, the programme includes:

  • Kripke’s modal argument against the descriptivist theory of proper names
  • The distinction between rigid and non-rigid designators
  • Kripke’s own so-called causal theory of reference
  • The relations between the necessary/contingent distinction and the distinctions a priori/a posteriori and analytic/synthetic
  • Kripke’s essentialism
  • Kripke’s modal argument against the mind-brain identity theory

Literature:

  • Kripke, S.: Naming and Necessity, Harvard University Press, 1980.

Monday:
Time: 16:00-18:00
Location: Gebäude A2 2 - Seminarraum 2.01