

intentus, diligentia est; ut his rebus adhibeat tamquam lumen aliquod memoriam, ut vocem, ut vires,
 150 diligentia est. Inter ingenium quidem et diligentiam perpaulum loci reliquum est arti. Ars demonstrat tantum, ubi quaeras, atque ubi sit illud, quod studeas invenire; reliqua sunt in cura, attentione animi, cogitatione, vigilantia, assiduitate, labore; complectar uno verbo, quo saepe iam usi sumus, diligentia; qua una virtute omnes virtutes reliquae
 151 continentur. Nam orationis quidem copia videmus ut abundant philosophi, qui, ut opinor—sed tu haec, Catule, melius—nulla dant praecepta dicendi nec idcirco minus, quaecumque res proposita est, suscipiunt, de qua copiose et abundanter loquantur.
 152 XXXVI. Tum Catulus: Est, inquit, ut dicis, Antoni, ut plerique philosophi nulla tradant praecepta dicendi et habeant paratum tamen quid de quaere dicant. Sed Aristoteles, is, quem ego maxime admiror, proposuit quosdam locos, ex quibus omnis argumenti via non modo ad philosophorum disputationem, sed etiam ad hanc, qua in causis utimur, inveniretur; a quo quidem homine iam dudum, Antoni, non aberrat oratio tua, sive tu similitudine illius divini ingenii in eadem incurris vestigia sive etiam illa ipsa legisti atque didicisti, quod quidem magis veri simile videtur. Plus enim te operae Graecis dedisse rebus video, quam
 153 putaramus. Tum ille: Verum, inquit, ex me

^a In *Topica*.

of attention and thought at full stretch, is still painstaking; to supplement all this with the torch of memory, with intonation and with energy, is painstaking once more. Indeed between talent and
 150 painstaking there is very little room left for art. Art merely points out where to search, and the locality of what you are anxious to find: all else depends on carefulness, mental concentration, reflection, watchfulness, persistence and hard work; I shall sum up these in the single word I have often used already, painstaking to wit, on which single virtue all other
 151 virtues are dependent. For we notice the overflowing copiousness of the diction of the philosophers who, I think (though you, Catulus, are better informed on these points), prescribe no rules for speaking, but none the less undertake to discuss with overflowing copiousness, whatever subject is laid before them."

152 XXXVI. Thereupon Catulus remarked, "You are right, Antonius, in saying that most philosophers prescribe no rules for speaking, and yet have something ready to say about everything. Aristotle, however, my own most particular admiration, set forth^a certain commonplaces, among which every line of argument might be found, not merely for philosophical debate, but also for our own contentions in the Courts: it is certainly long, Antonius, since your own style deviated from his principles, whether it be that through likeness to that godlike genius you fall into the same track, or, as seems far more probable, you too have perused and learned those very maxims. For I perceive that you have bestowed more pains
 153 on Greek literature than we had supposed." And the other answered, "Catulus, I will tell you the

Similar
teachings
of Aristotle.

- 155 palam semper habuerunt. Atque ego hoc ex eis saepe audiui, cum dicerent pergratum Athenienses et sibi fecisse et multis principibus civitatis, quod, cum ad senatum legatos de suis maximis rebus mitterent, tres illius aetatis nobilissimos philosophos misissent, Carneadem et Critolaum et Diogenem; itaque eos, dum Romae essent, et a se et ab aliis frequenter auditos; quos tu cum haberes auctores, Antoni, miror cur philosophiae sicut Zethus ille
 156 Pacuvianus prope bellum indixeris. Minime, inquit Antonius, ac sic decrevi philosophari potius, ut Neoptolemus apud Ennium 'Paucis: nam omnino haud placet.' Sed tamen haec est mea sententia, quam videbar exposuisse: ego ista studia non improbo, moderata modo sint: opinionem istorum studiorum et suspicionem artificii apud eos, qui res iudicent, oratori adversariam esse arbitror, imminuit enim et oratoris auctoritatem et orationis fidem.
- 157 XXXVIII. Sed, ut eo revocetur, unde huc declinavit oratio, ex tribus istis clarissimis philosophis, quos Romam venisse dixisti, videsne Diogenem eum fuisse, qui diceret artem se tradere bene disserendi et vera ac falsa diiudicandi, quam verbo Graeco *διαλεκτικήν* appellaret? In hac arte, si modo est haec ars, nullum est praeceptum, quo modo verum
 158 inveniatur, sed tantum est, quo modo iudicetur. Nam et omne, quod eloquimur sic, ut id aut esse dicamus aut non esse, et, si simpliciter dictum sit, suscipiunt

^a In 155 B.C. The Athenians had pillaged Oropus, on the Boeotian frontier, and had been sentenced by umpires appointed by the Romans to a fine of 500 talents, reduced to 100 after this embassy.

^b See *Remains of Old Latin* (L.C.L.), ii. pp. 162-163.

^c *Ibid.* i. pp. 368-369, and Aulus Gellius v. 15. 9 and 16. 5.

- 155 personages from Greece. Moreover I have often heard those notables speak of the vast pleasure afforded to themselves and many leaders of the State by the Athenians, in having sent,^a as envoys to the Senate on business of supreme importance to Athens, the three most illustrious philosophers of that day, Carneades, Critolaus and Diogenes, who accordingly, during their stay in Rome, frequently had my informants and others for an audience: with these witnesses before you, Antonius, I marvel why, like that Zethus described by Pacuvius,^b you have all but
 156 declared war against Philosophy." "Not at all," replied Antonius, "but rather I have determined to philosophize, as Neoptolemus says in Ennius, 'In a few things, for I don't want to do so in all ways.'^c For all that, however, my verdict, as I thought I had made plain, is this: I do not disapprove of such pursuits, if kept within limits, though I hold that a reputation for such pursuits, or any suggestion of artifice, is likely to prejudice an orator with the judiciary: for it weakens at once the credibility of the orator and the cogency of his oratory.

- 157 XXXVIII. "But, to recall Oratory to the point at which this digression started, do you observe that, of those three most illustrious philosophers, who visited Rome as you told us, it was Diogenes who claimed to be teaching an art of speaking well, and of distinguishing truth from error, which art he called by the Greek name of dialectic? This art, if indeed it be an art, contains no directions for dis-
 158 covering truth, but only for testing it. For as to every proposition that we enunciate with an affirmation of its truth or falsity, if it be affirmed without qualification, the dialecticians undertake to decide

Stoic doctrine useless for the orator.

dialectici, ut iudicent, verumne sit an falsum, et, si coniuncte sit elatum, et adiuncta sint alia, iudicant, rectene adiuncta sint et verane summa sit unius cuiusque rationis, et ad extremum ipsi se compungunt suis acuminibus et multa quaerendo reperiunt non modo ea, quae iam non possint ipsi dissolvere, sed etiam quibus ante exorsa, et potius detexta, prope
 159 retexantur. Hic nos igitur Stoicus iste nihil adiuvat, quoniam, quem ad modum inveniam quid dicam, non docet; atque idem etiam impedit, quod et multa reperit, quae negat ullo modo posse dissolvi, et genus sermonis affert non liquidum, non fustum ac profluens, sed exile, aridum, concisum ac minutum, quod si quis probabit, ita probabit, ut oratori tamen aptum non esse fateatur. Haec enim nostra oratio multitudinis est auribus accommodanda, ad oblectandos animos, ad impellendos, ad ea probanda, quae non aurificis statera, sed populari quadam trutina examinantur.

160 Qua re istam artem totam dimittamus, quae in excogitandis argumentis muta nimium est, in iudicandis nimium loquax. Critolaum istum, quem cum Diogene venisse commemoras, puto plus huic nostro studio prodesse potuisse. Erat enim ab isto Aristotele, a cuius inventis tibi ego videor non longe aberrare. Atque inter hunc Aristotelem, cuius et illum legi librum, in quo exposuit dicendi artes omnium superiorum, et illos, in quibus ipse sua quaedam de eadem arte dixit,

whether it be true or false; and, if again it be stated hypothetically, with collateral propositions annexed, then they decide whether these others are properly annexed, and whether the conclusion drawn from each and every reasoning is correct: and in the end they prick themselves with their own barbs, and by wide investigation discover not only difficulties such as they themselves can no longer solve, but also others by which webs already attacked, or rather well-
 159 nigh unwound, are tangled up again. In this connexion then that eminent Stoic is of no help to us, since he does not teach me how to discover what to say; and he actually hinders me, by finding many difficulties which he pronounces quite insoluble, and by introducing a kind of diction that is not lucid, copious and flowing, but meagre, spiritless, cramped and paltry; and, if any man commends this style, it will only be with the qualification that it is unsuitable to an orator. For this oratory of ours must be adapted to the ears of the multitude, for charming or urging their minds to approve of proposals, which are weighed in no goldsmith's balance, but in what I may call common scales.

160 "Let us therefore renounce entirely that art which has too little to say when proofs are being thought out, and too much when they are being assessed. That Critolaus, whose visit in company with Diogenes you recall, might have been more useful, I think, in this pursuit of ours. For he was a follower of your Aristotle, from whose doctrines you think my own differ but little. And between this Aristotle (I read also that book of his, setting forth the rhetorical theories of all his forerunners, and those other works containing sundry observations of his own on the same art),

Insight of
Aristotle
and ability
in argu-
ment of
Carneades.