

Antonius; 'ac sic decrevi philosophari potius, ut Neoptolemus apud Ennium "paucis: nam omnino haud placet." Sed tamen non improbo, moderata modo sint: opinionem istorum studiorum et suspicionem artificii apud eos, qui res iudicent, oratori ad-
 38 et orationis fidem. Sed, ut eo revocetur, unde huc declinavit
 157 oratio, ex tribus istis clarissimis philosophis, quos Romam venisse dixisti, videsne Diogenem eum fuisse, qui diceret artem se tradere bene disserendi et vera ac falsa diiudicandi, quam
 10 verbo Graeco *διαλεκτικήν* appellaret? In hac arte, si modo est haec ars, nullum est praeceptum, quo modo verum inveniatur,
 158 sed tantum est, quo modo iudicetur; nam et omne, quod elo-

7. *huc* incl. K.

13. *et om.* K: incl. PAH.

tem consumitur: cp. de Inv. i. 50. 94; Hor. Ep. i. 18. 39.

1. *ac . . . potius*: cp. § 74 (note). Cp. de Rep. i. 18. 30 'atque idem [Sex. Aelius, cp. i. 45. 198 note] . . . Zethum illum Pacuvii nimis inimicum doctrinae esse dicebat: magis eum delectabat Neoptolemus Ennii, qui se ait philosophari velle, sed paucis: nam omnino haud placere.' Similarly in Tusc. D. ii. 1. 1. Ribbeck restored the lines thus, 'Philosophari est mihi necesse, at paucis, nam omnino haud placet | Dégustandum ex ea, non in eam ingurgitandum censeo;' but he has more recently withdrawn the second line, in consequence of the objections of Mercklin, p. 65 (Fragm. Trag. 2). 'Necesse' is from Tusc. D. 1. c.: and the last line from A. Gell. v. 16. 'Decrevi' may perhaps have a reference to 'decretum,' the usual Latin for *δόγμα*: 'my creed is.'

2. *paucis*, 'only a little': perhaps this idiom arose from the phrase 'paucis verbis,' but if so, it came to be used without any reference to speaking. Mr. Roby has kindly furnished me with many parallel instances, from which I select 'paucis agere,' Liv. xlii. 34. 1; 'paucis auscultare,' Ter. Andr. 536; 'pluribus nolle,' Liv. xxxiv. 32; 'alternis,' Liv. ii. 6. 9; iv. 52. 11, etc. See Roby, § 1237.

3. *videbar*, at the close of his exposition: § 153.

4. *modo* = 'dummodo,' Roby, § 1668. The view is much like that of Callicles in Plato, Gorg. p. 484 c, *φιλοσοφία γάρ τοι ἐστὶ χάρις, ἂν τις αὐτοῦ μετρίως ᾄψῃται ἐν τῇ ἡλικίᾳ· ἂν δὲ περαιτέρω τοῦ δεόντος ἐνδιατρίψῃ, διαφθορὰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων.* Cp.

Tac. Agric. 4 'Memoria teneo solitum ipsum, narrare se prima in inventa studium philosophiae acrius, ultra quam concessum Romano ac senatori, hausisse, ni prudentia matris incensum ac flagrantem animum coercuisset:' and de Fin. i. 1. 1.

7. *eo*, i. e. to determine the relations of philosophy to rhetorical 'inventio.'

9. *videsne*, § 64 (note).

Diogenem, the Stoic: cp. Top. 2. 6 'Cum omnis ratio diligens disserendi duas habeat artis, unam inveniendi, alteram diiudicandi, utriusque princeps, ut mihi quidem videtur, Aristoteles fuit; Stoici autem in altera elaboraverunt: iudicandi enim vias diligenter persecuti sunt ea scientia, quam *διαλεκτικήν* appellant: inveniendi artem, quae *τοπική* dicitur, quaeque et ad usum potior erat, et ordine naturae certe prior, totam reliquerunt.' Cp. Zeller's Stoics, p. 70 ff.

artem bene disserendi: cp. Alex. Aphr. Top. 3 *οἱ μὲν ἀπὸ τῆς Στοᾶς ὀριζόμενοι τὴν διαλεκτικὴν ἐπιστήμην τοῦ εὖ λέγειν ὀρίζονται, τὸ δὲ εὖ λέγειν ἐν τῷ ἀληθῆ καὶ προσήκοντα λέγειν εἶναι τιθέμενοι, τοῦτο δὲ ἴδιον ἡγούμενοι τοῦ φιλοσόφου, κατὰ τῆς τελεωτάτης φιλοσοφίας φέρουσιν αὐτὸ κ.τ.λ.*

12. *nullum est praeceptum*: the Stoics did not include rhetoric under dialectic, but made the two to be distinct divisions of *τὸ λογικὸν μέρος*. Rhetoric however was of little importance with them, being merely 'a collection of artificial rules, without philosophical worth' (Zeller, p. 72). Logic received special attention.

13. *nam et omne*: so *AEH*; γ alone of the good MSS. omitting *et*; 'et omne' answers to 'et ad extremum.' Translate:

quimur sic, ut id aut esse dicamus aut non esse, et, si simpliciter dictum sit, suscipiunt dialectici, ut iudicent, verumne sit an falsum, et, si coniuncte sit elatum et adiuncta sint alia, iudicant, rectene adiuncta sint et verane summa sit unius cuiusque rationis, et ad extremum ipsi se compungunt suis acuminibus et multa quaerendo reperiunt non modo ea, quae iam non possint ipsi dissolvere, sed etiam quibus ante exorsa et potius detexta prope retexantur. Hic nos igitur Stoicus iste nihil adiuvat, quoniam, 159

'For whatever proposition we make, declaring it to be either true or false [i. e. that there is no middle course], if on the one hand it is a simple proposition the logicians undertake to decide whether it be true or false, and if on the other hand it be stated in connexion with other propositions which are appended to it, they decide whether they are correctly appended, and whether the conclusion of each argument is correct; so they prick their own fingers at last with their own sharpness, and by their extensive researches they discover not only arguments [sophisms] which they cannot themselves solve, but also objections by which arguments which they have previously started or rather almost brought to a conclusion are upset.' For the Stoic *ἀξιώματα* or 'judgments' (*effata*) see Reid's reff. on Acad. ii. 95.

efferre = 'state': cp. Or. 22. 72 'eadem res saepe aut probatur aut reicitur alio atque alio elata verbo.'

3. *adiunctum* is the word by which some translated the *συννημμένον ἀξίωμα* of the Stoic logic, i. e. the hypothetical judgment: cp. Gell. xvi. 8. 9 'sed quod Graeci *συννημμένον ἀξίωμα* dicunt, alii nostrorum adiunctum, alii connexum dixerunt; id connexum tale est, "si Plato ambulet, Plato movetur," etc. Cp. Diog. L. vii. 71 *συννημμένον μὲν ἐστίν, ὡς ὁ Χρύσιππος ἐν ταῖς Διαλεκτικαῖς φησὶ καὶ Διογένης ἐν τῇ Διαλεκτικῇ τέχνῃ τὸ συνεστὸς διὰ τοῦ "εἰ" συναπτικοῦ συνδέσμου. ἐπαγγέλλεται δὲ ὁ σύνδεσμος οὗτος ἀκολουθεῖν τὸ δεύτερον τῷ πρώτῳ, οἷον "εἰ ἡμέρα ἐστὶ φῶς ἐστὶ."* Cp. Prantl, Gesch. d. Logik, p. 446-7. Cic. however prefers to translate *συννημμένον* by *connexum* or sometimes *coniunctio*: so it is not likely that the word is here limited to that technical sense. Pid. and Sorof take it to be 'minor premisses' or 'assumptions,' but the regular term for these is 'adsumptiones' [= *πρόσληψις* of the Stoic terminology, Zeller, p. 117, note]:

cp. de Inv. i. 34. 59 'aut unum in locum cum conduxerit breviter propositionem [the major premiss] et adsumptionem, *adiungit*, quid ex his conficiatur:' and then follows an example. Cp. Tusc. v. 25. 72 'sequitur tertia, quae per omnes partes sapientiae manat et funditur, quae rem definit, genera dispertit, *sequentia adiungit*, perfecta concludit, vera et falsa diiudicat, disserendi ratio et scientia.' Ernesti, Clav. Cic. s. v. explains *adiungere* 'quid ex quoque sequatur videre, vel docere,' which is nearly correct, except that it unduly restricts the meaning. The Stoics paid great, and indeed undue attention to fallacies (e. g. Chrysippus among a number of treatises on the subject wrote no less than five on the one fallacy of the *ψευδόμενος*), but were so far from dealing with them satisfactorily, that they could often find no way out of their difficulties except by declining to continue the argument. Cp. Acad. ii. 29. 93, where the phrase for this is 'quiescere' = *ἡσυχάζειν*. See Zeller, p. 122, note.

5. *acuminibus*: cp. Acad. ii. 75 'contorta et aculeata *σοφίσματα*,' with Reid's note.

7. *dissolvere*: Acad. ii. 46.

exorsa, § 145 (note).

detexta prope: cp. Plaut. Amph. 290 'illic hoc homo denuo uolt pallium detexere,' where the interpretation of Lewis and Short is absurd: as the web in weaving was struck repeatedly by the shuttle and the comb, to 'finish weaving' a man's cloak was equivalent to giving him 'a good dressing.' Titinius, quoted by Nonius, p. 406. 19: (Ribbeck, Frag. Com. p. 136), has 'quae inter decem annos nequisti unam togam [Ribb. *tógulam unam*] detexere.' Cp. Lorenz on Plaut. Pseud. 384 (399 R.) 'neque exordiri primum unde occipiás, habes, | neque detexundam ad telam certos terminos.' Ribbeck Frag. Incert. 97 'Nunc ego te ab summo iam detexam exordio.'

8. *retexantur*: cp. Acad. ii. 29. 95

quem ad modum inveniam quid dicam, non docet; atque idem etiam impedit, quod et multa reperit, quae negat ullo modo ac profluens, sed exile, aridum, concisum ac minutum, quod si qui probabit, ita probabit, ut oratori tamen aptum non esse fateatur; haec enim nostra oratio multitudinis est auribus ad- commodanda, ad oblectandos animos, ad impellendos, ad ea probanda, quae non aurificis statera, sed populari quadam trutina 160 examinantur; qua re istam artem totam dimittimus, quae in excogitandis argumentis muta nimium est, in iudicandis nimium 10 loquax. Critolaum istum, quem cum Diogene venisse commemoras, puto plus huic nostro studio prodesse potuisse; erat enim ab isto Aristotele, a cuius inventis tibi ego videor non

9. *dimittimus AEH* γ Lagg. 13, 36 S: *dimitemus* KP. cum B Lagg. 2, 4, 32. *dimittamus* s vulg. (quod tuetur Reid).

'quid quod eadem illa ars, quasi Penelope telam retexens, tollit ad extremum superiora.' The whole context, in which Cicero is discussing the Stoic dialectic is well worth reading (with Reid's notes) as illustrative of the argument of Antonius here.

2. *multa reperit*: e.g. such fallacies as the 'mentiens,' the 'calvus' and the 'acervalis.' Cp. Cic. de Div. ii. 4. 11; Whately's Logic, Bk. III, and De Morgan's Formal Logic, ch. xiii, which is as amusing as it is sound.

3. *adfert*, 'employs'; cp. de Off. i. 3. 9. *liquidum, fusum, profluens*, 'transparent, smooth, and flowing': cp. § 64 and Or. 20. 66 'in his tracta quaedam et fluens (oratio) expetitur.'

4. *exile*, 'meagre.' *concisum*, 'broken': 'genus dicendi *concisum* . . . numquam in laude, saepe in vitio ponitur.' Ell. cp. § 61, 327.

minutum, 'disjointed,' 'staccato' = *κατακεκομμένη λέξις*. Reid on Acad. ii. 75. The last two epithets are almost equivalent: hence the use of *ac*.

5. *ita . . . ut*, 'with this limitation . . . that': cp. § 327 'concisum est ita, ut non brevitati servitum sit, sed magis venustati.'

8. *statera*, 'balance,' can hardly be anything but a heteroclitite adaptation of a Greek *στατήρ*, belonging to the same first stage of the introduction of Greek words into Latin, to which *trutina* = *τροπάνη*, and many similar terms of commerce belong: cp. Corssen, ii. 256, and 814: *στατήρ* is no longer extant in the meaning of 'balance,' but it would be the normal

derivative from *ιστάναί*, in its common signification of 'to weigh.' The word is usually said to mean a 'steelyard,' and this is evidently the instrument described under the name of *statera* by Vitruv. x. 8. No other passage but that in Vitruvius requires the meaning 'steelyard,' while some, in which two scales are spoken of (e.g. Petron. Sat. 35; Suet. Vesp. 25), positively require the meaning 'balance.' Cp. Conington on Pers. v. 100 'certo compescere puncto nescius examen:' and Pers. l. 6 'examenque improbum in illa castiges trutina.' Here it is evidently the more delicate instrument. Cp. Varro Sat. Men. p. 198, l. 8 (Riese) (*περὶ φιλοσοφίας*) 'itaque videas barbato nostro illum commentari et unum quodque verbum statera auraria pendere.' The quotations from Persius also give the use of 'examen,' from which 'examinare,' in its primary force here retained, is derived.

13. *ab isto Aristotele*, 'a follower of Aristotle,' [cp. de Fin. v. 3. 7 'ab eo (Zenone) qui sunt,' i.e. the Stoics] not in this instance a pupil, a rendering which chronology forbids: Aristotle died B.C. 322. Critolaus must have been born about B.C. 220-200. He was the sixth head of the Peripatetic school, the succession being Aristotle, Theophrastus, Straton, Lycon, Ariston, Critolaus. Critolaus had given much attention to rhetoric, which he maintained was not a science or an art, but 'usum dicendi (nam hoc *τριβή* significat)': Quintil. ii. 15. 23: cp. de Fin. v. 5. *inventis*, 'doctrines.'

longe aberrare. Atque inter hunc Aristotelem, cuius et illum legi librum, in quo exposuit dicendi artis omnium superiorum, et illos, in quibus ipse sua quaedam de eadem arte dixit, et hos germanos huius artis magistros hoc mihi visum est interesse, 5 quod ille eadem acie mentis, qua rerum omnium vim naturamque viderat, haec quoque aspexit, quae ad dicendi artem, quam ille despiciebat, pertinebant; illi autem, qui hoc solum colendum ducebant, habitarunt in hac una ratione tractanda non eadem prudentia, qua ille, sed usu in hoc uno genere studioque maiore. 10 Carneadi vero vis incredibilis illa dicendi et varietas perquam esset optanda nobis, qui nullam umquam in illis suis disputationibus rem defendit, quam non probarit, nullam oppugnavit, quam non everterit. Sed hoc maius est quiddam, quam ab his, qui haec tradunt et docent, postulandum sit.

15 Ego autem, si quem nunc plane rudem institui ad dicen- 39
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1. *Aristotelem* incl. K.

3. *de eadem arte* incl. K.

6. *ille* incl. K.

13. *his M¹: eis M²*.

1. *cuius . . . librum*, i.e. *τεχνῶν συναγωγῆν*: Introd. p. 41.

3. *illos*, the three books of the Rhetoric, and also the Topica, § 152.

4. *germanos*, 'regular': cp. ad Att. iv. 5. 3 'scio me asinum germanum fuisse'; Or. 9. 32 'germanos se putant esse Thucydides.' The word is here used with a certain irony.

6. *viderat*: the tense does not necessarily imply that Aristotle's Rhetoric was one of the latest of his works. The first sketch of it was among his earliest (Stahr in Dict. Biog. i. 332), though it was long in revision.

7. *despiciebat*: i.e. in its practical application. Cicero when arguing that no Greek (except perhaps Demetrius Phalereus) had been distinguished at once as a philosopher and as an orator, adds (de Off. i. 1. 4) 'eodemque modo de Aristotele et Isocrate iudicio, quorum uterque suo studio delectatus contempsit alterum.' It is not correct to say that Aristotle despised the art of rhetoric, which he treated with a profundity and completeness rarely if ever equalled: but he attached much less importance to form than to substance: and so was often at variance with the views of the 'stylistic' school, represented especially by Isocrates: Introd. pp. 39-41. For Cicero's acquaintance with the Rhetoric of Aristotle see § 32 (note).

8. *habitarunt in hac una ratione*

tractanda, 'dwelt upon the discussion of this one branch of the theory' of rhetoric: *habitare* in this sense is a favourite expression with Cicero: cp. Or. 15. 49 'in bonis haerebit et habitabit suis': cp. § 292; the same figure is somewhat less metaphorically applied in i. 62. 264, and is otherwise expressed in iii. 20. 77.

10. *Carneadi*: i. 19. 88 (note). For his oratorical power cp. i. 11. 45 (note); iii. 18. 68; Tusc. v. 4. 11; Acad. i. 12. 46 (Reid); ii. 18. 60; de Fin. iii. 12. 41. *perquam*, § 201. Roby, § 1649.

11. *esset*, i.e. if we had the choice, which we have not.

12. *probarit*: see note on *insederit*, § 122.

13. *everterit*, 'upset'; cp. *ἀνασκευή*. *maius quam . . . postulandum sit*: for the omission of *ut* (the regular classical expression) or the relative (used by Livy and the poets) after a comparative adverb, especially after *potius*, cp. Kühner, ii. 857; Madvig on de Fin. iv. 8. 20. Whether it can be omitted after an adjective is very doubtful, hence it is better to take *sit* as hypothetical 'than would be fair to demand.'

§§ 162-177. A rapid sketch of the doctrine of 'topics,' (which are derived either from the case itself or from without) with illustrations (§§ 162-173). A brief treatment is pronounced sufficient; for attention and natural acuteness will do more