According to most philosophy textbooks, multiple realization defeats the identity theory: if pain can be multiply realized—say, by amygdala activation in humans and by inflated cavaties in Martians—pain cannot be identical to brain processes. However, some contemporary philosophers of mind disagree. In their recent book “The Multiple Realization Book” (OUP 2016), Tom Polger and Larry Shapiro argue that in fact multiple realization does not bring down the identity theory as originally formulated by Place, Smart and Feigl as easily. In this seminar we shall explore their defense. Is the identity theory indeed still alive and kicking? Or is it rather a form of functionalism that a present-day self-identified identity theorist must embrace?
Zeit: Donnerstag 10-12 Uhr
Ort: Gebäude A2.3 - Raum 0.09
- DozentIn: Lena Kästner